Transport and Land-use in Greater Santiago (GS) Uncoordinated Centralization and market-driven Planning

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Presentation Plan

Scope and Context

- Power balance among institutional levels
- Chilean Institutional framework

Controversies

- Transantiago public transport reform
- 100th Metropolitan Plan Modification

Reform Perspectives






Power balance among institutional levels

Different objectives depending on administrative scale:

- State, maximum output
- Region, per capita costbenefit optimum
- Commune, minimum environmental costs

Cost-benefit of Urban Size




Source: "The Economics of Urban Size" William Alonso, 1971.





Chilean Institutional framework



- A relatively small, very centralized public sector: 1/4 GDP
- Sectoral Ministries that control most of the public budget, but are unable to coordinate
- Two controversies that illustrate this: Transantiago & PRMS 100





Transantiago: modernizing GS, forgetting users

A major public transport reform started and implemented by a **presidential decree**

- No democratic controls
- An interministerial committee with no clear leadership
- Main aims: modernize the capital city and attract foreign investments





As the bus lines had to be profitable, frequencies, among other service standards, were lowered

Infrastructure, depending on other ministries, wasn't ready on time





Transantiago: modernizing GS, forgetting users

Local authorities and users were not considered in the design. They still have little influence

Their means for exerting pressure or expressing frustration are minor lawsuits... or violence




The operation contracts have recently been redesigned, addressing some major service problems and deficit reduction

But a fundamental *a priori* remains: how can you operate a high quality public transport system **without subsidies?**





PRMS 100: to sprawl or not to sprawl?



100th modification: 14% increase in urban land, expansion under development conditions

A long bureaucratic odyssey where national politics dominate over metropolitan concerns:

→ The PRMS 100 is frozen and almost unchanged






Transantiago + PRMS 100: the incoherent metropolis

With such a small public sector, urban development is too dependent on private investors

As each sector has different investment imperatives, the result is suboptimal:

- For welfare and equality
- For public finances







Reform Perspectives in Chile

Strengthening and democratizing the Regional Government seems the most feasible option towards intersectoral urban planning

Important reforms are being implemented, but there is a huge retard in inequalities, welfare policies and decentralization

A very slow institutional evolution since the 1980 Constitution, while society has rapidly changed

Social upheaval: major reforms in 2-5 years?





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Thanks for your attention

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